

REFUGEE, MIGRATION, DIASPORA

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Lecture 07

Lecture 07: Understanding the Borderland Discourse

Thank you. Good morning and welcome back to the lecture series on refugees, migration, and diaspora. So today we will be understanding the borderland discourse: what is borderland, the discourse and discussions, the polemics and the contentions surrounding or centering the borderland. So, borders, boundaries, frontiers, and borderlands are human creations which are grounded in various ethical traditions. There is nothing natural, nothing pre-given about borders.

We have to understand they have been created at some points in history by different human civilizations, by different social groups, under different socio-historical, political, and even economic conditions. So critics like Allen Buchanan and Margaret Moore, in their work *States, Nations and Borders: The Ethics of Making Boundaries*, which came out in 2003, compare natural and international law traditions with the Jewish, Christian, Confucian, Islamic, and liberal ethical traditions of boundaries and defined that the ethical traditions are somewhat ambiguous in nature in terms of how to establish or how to define borders, and the question of borders includes the questions of settlement, purchase, inheritance, as well as secession.

Theorizing Borderland

- Borders, boundaries, frontiers and borderlands are human creations that are grounded in various ethical traditions
- Allen Buchanan and Margaret Moore in their *States, Nations and Borders: The Ethics of Making Boundaries* (2003) compare natural and international law traditions with the Jewish, Christian, Confucian, Islamic and Liberal ethical traditions of boundaries, although they find that **the ethical traditions are somewhat ambiguous in terms of how to establish borders, including settlement, purchase, inheritance and secession; and that all of these traditions agreed that conquest is unjustifiable**
- The conceptualization of border is predominant since the time of the Roman empire



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And the fact that all of these traditions, most of them coming from the Abrahamic tradition, agree that conquest is not justifiable. They are talking about all these factors like settlement, purchase, inheritance, secession, and they all agree that conquest cannot be justified vis-à-vis the question of the ethical tradition of boundaries, frontiers, and borderlands. Now the conceptualization of borders has been predominant since the time of the Roman Empire. So, boundaries were organized in the Roman Empire according to a hierarchy of spaces.

So, territories of varied dimensions and functions, which include settlements, cities, provinces, and regions, would be taken into consideration when talking about boundaries. So, during the Middle Ages, there is ample evidence to say that the feudal system was more interested in the control of cities and territories, and these cities and territories would have vague borderlands rather than clear-cut boundaries. So, according to Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly, I quote, thanks to geographers, however, mapping technology allowed rulers to have a spatial view of their positions. Thus, what were originally borderlands or border regions, referring to more fluid and vague spaces, progressively became permanent boundaries or frontiers.

Now, early works of geographers and historians contributed to the formation of the modern political borders of nation-states and how the boundaries of these nation-states work in a given geopolitical scenario. This question can be dealt with through international recognition by other boundaries of sovereign and territorially demarcated states. So, these states are all abutting, and one nation-state's demarcated boundaries and limits as well as which areas it can rule, these questions are contingent with, or these questions are incumbent on, the boundaries and limits of other sovereign states.

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- Early works of geographers and historians contributed to the formation of the modern political border of nation states and how their boundaries work in a geopolitical scenario, which required international recognition by other boundaries of sovereign and territorially demarcated states
- As summarized by Julian Minghi in the first half of the twentieth century, "the earliest systematic studies of boundaries focused on both natural and man-made boundaries" (1963, p. 409)
- Ellen Churchill Semple, for instance, compares boundaries and frontiers, arguing that natural geographic frontiers, where humans cannot settle, are ideal boundaries



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So, these states are all abutting one another; they are adjacent to one another, and a nation-state boundary is a very strategic way of defining where a given people, a given social group, a given national community belong in a legitimate way and where they cannot navigate without a visa or passport. So basically, it's a way nation-states are demarcated in such a way as to define the terrain, the territory within which a national community can navigate without a visa or passport legally. And beyond a certain border, which is the national border, they would need their credentials as foreign visitors. So, as summarized by critic Julian Minghi in the first half of the 20th century, I quote Minghi, 'The earliest systematic studies of boundaries focused on both natural and man-made boundaries,' unquote. Ellen Churchill Semple, for example, compares boundaries and frontiers by arguing that natural geographic frontiers, where humans cannot settle, are ideal boundaries.

So, natural geographic frontiers are defined by desolate lands where human habitation is minimal or nonexistent, according to Semple. Thomas H. Holdich and William Lyde widely discussed the virtues of boundaries. So, there are critics who view borders and boundaries as salient features that maintain peace and harmony, limit tensions, and prevent war-like situations. So, these critics like Holdich and Lyde view boundaries as either good or bad, depending on their intrinsic merit in fostering or limiting tensions and possibly preventing war-like situations between different nation-states.

So, this is where many scholars who discuss the partition of the Indian subcontinent are coming from. They would actually support this argument or opinion that the partition of India was indeed a good decision, as it has prevented war-like situations. It has stopped war-like situations. Otherwise, what would happen in an undivided India after the British left are possibilities of endless civil wars. So, some people are proponents of boundaries and see the virtues, the positive side of defining boundaries.

So, borderlands are territories that are subordinated to a certain national regime and are therefore subject to the norms of its specific political system. Hence, along a border, two extremely different political systems may meet if subjected to vastly different political norms, thereby rendering the borderland volatile. Here, the example that comes to mind is definitely the Indo-Pak border, the India-Pakistan border. We have the Wagah border in India.

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- Thomas H. Holdich and William Lyde widely discussed about the virtues of boundaries. They viewed boundaries as being either good or bad, depending on their intrinsic merit in fostering or limiting tensions, and possibly arresting war-like situations, between states
- **Borderlands** are territories that are subordinated to a certain national regime and are therefore subject to the norms of its specific political system. Hence along a border, two extremely different political systems may meet if subjected to extremely different political norms – thereby rendering the borderland as volatile
- History and the collective memory of a population are sometimes stronger reference points in the construction of identity than are national discourses. In numerous cases borderlands are also zones of cultural overlap, where national identities become blurred among the population



Every day, for the last several years, we have practiced a flag-lowering ceremony. A certain audience gathers around this ceremony when the gates of India and Pakistan are open. At sunset, the flags are lowered, and the gates are closed. The parade that happens daily involves Indian and Pakistani soldiers from their respective countries who display their military skills, making the place seem not like the most peaceful piece of land.

Of course, the place appears volatile. The place seems full of, even brimming with, nationalist sentiments. Thus, we see it as a meeting point—the Wagah border, the Indo-Pak border—where vastly different political systems converge. The Indian nation-state, which upholds and celebrates secular values, contrasts with Pakistan, a nation-state that has always affirmed its Islamic values as shaping its nationhood, right? So, history and collective memory are sometimes stronger reference points for identity construction than national discourses.

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Because national discourses, we must understand, are more formal. They are top-down. They are streamlined. And hence, they are selective. National discourses cannot accommodate the complexity, the layers, or the contradictions that a borderland entails.

And so, identity that is shaped through the borderland culture, through the borderland discourse, is something more or less than the purely streamlined national discourse. Right. So, in numerous cases, we see the borderlands are also zones of cultural overlap where two abetting nations' cultures kind of merge, interchange, and almost become identical. It could be that the two nations share very different values, just like in the case of India and Pakistan, whose values as nation-states are vastly different. But borderland cultures do share certain elements in terms of the people, the local people that inhabit the border areas.

So, here, the national identities to some extent become blurred among the population. So, over the course of history, the functions and rules of borderlands have continuously evolved and changed. And this change, this journey, can be understood only in its specific context. So, borderlands are shaped by immediate history, politics, and the power dynamics, as well as by the cultural and social issues.

Critic Ansipasi in 2003 suggests that borderlands have been actively contested and negotiated throughout the past, and they keep appearing and disappearing. So, while they are man-made, we also have to understand that borders are not forever, and borders are also not forever permanent in terms of the contours they encapsulate or define. Borders are, therefore, complex, spatial, and social phenomena which are neither static nor invariable, but which must be understood as highly dynamic, highly changeable, highly protean, and fraught with different kinds of socio-political and cultural tensions.

They carry the historical burden or the historical baggage from different junctions in time. They carry the historical burden or the historical baggage from different junctions of time. Borderland communities lying on the margins of more than one state exist in different development modes and under different terms of governance, which may not exactly tally with or adhere to the mainland culture and governance style. Often, the communities settling in the borderland areas are physically closer to a foreign regime and farther from the central power of their own respective government. So they are closer to a nation-state that begins, you know, at the end of their own national border.

And they can identify less with the mainland politics and the mainland culture. People living in the borderlands are therefore acquainted with different regimes of power. And

they may be skillful users of more than one language and more than one tradition. They often handle more than one currency for their daily interactions and exchanges. Anthropologists have been actively studying borders and borderlands, not only because many borderlands have been neglected in research, but also because there are significant cases where anthropologists find concentrated marginalized groups, such as refugees and minorities, intriguing in cross-border state relations and human interactions.

And forming thereby mixed and blurred identities with displaced populations, with populations constantly entering and exiting the border. The borders being not sealed but most of the time porous in nature, this intriguing cross-border state relations and human interactions and exchanges result in certain very interesting hybrid, mixed, and blurred identities, right. So, there are two things happening simultaneously: the nation-states with the borders and boundaries trying, at least on pen and paper, to maintain some kind of pure, immiscible national community, And then in practice, at the ground-zero level, we see the borderland communities creating their own habitation, creating their own ecosystem, which is sometimes, you know, important for their sustenance and survival.

And such cultures actually destabilize the question of national purity or an ideal national community because people are constantly going out, and there is an influx of Sometimes, many times at an illegal level, something that is not sanctioned by either of the nation-states. So, borderland ethnographies often provide interesting stories of alternative voices, alternative power positions, alternative worldviews, and alternative state relations, history, culture, and identity which deviate, which do not really cohere with what has been defined by the respective nation-state. Critics Alexander Horstmann and Reed L. Wadley suggest that while borders are themselves defining and delimiting state power and sovereignty, At the same time, they are sites; they form sites that constantly challenge and negotiate such state power.

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- **Borderland** ethnographies often provide interesting stories of alternative voices and views of state relations, history, culture, and identity that deviate from what has been defined by the state
- Alexander Horstmann and Reed L. Wadley suggests that while borders are themselves defining and delimiting state power and sovereignty, they are at the same time sites that constantly challenge and negotiate such state power. Borders and boundaries are often imagined as hard and enclosing frontiers, yet many of them are, in reality actually porous
- Borderlanders can be active “border-crossers” who make use of such skills to challenge state control and discourses on “boundaries” in order to work on the improvement of life chances and livelihoods



So, there is this thesis and antithesis, this stabilizing and destabilizing simultaneously happening vis-à-vis the borders where, to begin with, the borders are supposed to maintain the state power and sovereignty. And at the same time, such power, such sanctity of a national habitat, is challenged and negotiated through the actual happenings in the borderland culture. So, borders and boundaries are often imagined as hard and enclosing frontiers. However, in actuality, they are not. They are not completely sealed.

So, borderlanders can be active border crossers who make use of skills to challenge state control, permeate into the other states' terrain, and thereby destabilize the discourses on boundaries in order to work on the improvement of life chances and livelihoods. So, what happens is that when the nationally demarcated lines are being crossed by individuals, this activity is propelled by personal needs, by some very localized incentives, including chances of a better livelihood on the other side of the border. People navigate, people traverse onto the other side of the border, most of the time illegally, in order to find better jobs,

Better business, better livelihood. And this is happening at a subterranean level. This is not really sanctioned by either of the nation-states. Regarding borderland governance, Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly in 2013 suggests that while governance is never transparent, borderland governance is more than national government at its periphery, right? So, further, Yuk Wah Chan and Brantly Womack in 2016 suggest that borderland is a place of contact.

Its realities on the ground are not simply outcomes of national policies on each side. Instead, it is shaped through creatively interacting with opportunities and constraints. So, people actually work out their lives—the borderland people, the borderland communities—work out their lives through understanding, through gauging both the

opportunities as well as the constraints of what it means. To live on either side of the border or to traverse or expand their business or livelihood on the other side of the border. They try to gauge or envision the opportunities and constraints involved in cross-border communication and interactions.

So, borderland communities are often skillful at appropriating and posing challenges to the sanctity of state authorities and state policies. Now, whether viewed from the perspective of a single border trader or an entirely binational region, the borderlands are—we have to understand—they are lively, fluid places. They are contingent on their national definitions, but identities of and within borderlands shape themselves as they navigate between the opportunities opened by contact and the constraints of their situation. There are both things simultaneously going on. There is vulnerability, there is volatility, there are opportunities of cross-border trading and interactions of selling and buying.

But there are also constraints in terms of the border security force. For example, if any kind of smuggling activity or illegal activity is caught, the penalty—the consequences—can be severe, depending on how draconian or strict the national rules are in these cases. So, they are driven by both these determinants: on the one hand, the opportunities of cross-border interactions or communication; on the other hand, there are plenty of constraints, demarcations, dangers, and risks involved. So, asymmetry of resource accessibility is a root feature of borderland governance. This is because of the relationship of the periphery to the center as well as the relationship among the different states.

Moreover, what we see is that the international asymmetries of power, capabilities, and resources—all of these factors go on to shape the structure of border contact and governance. So, international relations, a nation's position vis-à-vis international politics, as well as the usually asymmetrical relationship between center and periphery. All these things shape the nature of border contact and governance. Borderland governance serves as a framework that is broad enough to cover both state and non-state actors. This special issue deals with a wide spectrum of issues.

These issues range from economic development through different forms of cross-border exchanges, such as trade, investment, cross-border marriage, and so forth. And they extend to trans-border human flows, which include borderland tourism, migration, as well as illegal human trafficking. So, borderland governance has within its ambit both state

and non-state actors. Borderland governance immediately involves interstate relationships, trans-border interactions, compatibility and incompatibility in terms of social, political, and economic systems, Value and ideological differences between two sovereign states, the power asymmetry vis-à-vis central governance and peripheral governance, alternate existences at the border, identity shifts, and the question of constant mobility.

Yuk Wah Chan and Caroline Grillot suggest that while one may assume that in border areas, frequent interaction across borders will bring familiarity with interchangeable identities and mixed ways of living; On the other hand, we see that border areas can also witness the worst types of stereotypes and conflicts due to intensified border interactions. So, just as borderlands can bring familiarity and opportunities for exchange, interchangeable identities, and a hybrid or mixed way of living, they can also become a site of intensified tension and conflict. The contingency of border realities can lead to rigidities. Identity as well as hybridization define people and are used by them as well.

So, what happens is that there are two types of tendencies in borderland culture because we see that people from two different nations—abutting nations—living in the border area are very similar in terms of their ethnicity, habits, language, and culture. So, from this phenomenon, two attitudes generally arise. One is to identify across the border. There is a trans-border identification with one another because of this similarity. Conversely, there can also be a tendency to maintain differences.

So, it all depends on whether humanity focuses on the similarities or the continuities between the people living in borderland culture. or the differences. Sometimes... I can give an example. In Amar Mitra's Wild Goose Country, we see that the Bengalis and the Bangladeshis are very similar in terms of how they look, how they speak, what they eat, and how they dress. It is indeed, you know,

Strange that there should be a border dividing them. But then the traders who come to buy and sell are sometimes very conscious of the side they come from. So, they want to call their currency taka and not rupees, as we call it in India. So, when someone asserts that my currency is called taka and not rupee, or my food is prepared in a certain style which is not exactly like the way Indians eat, they are thereby asserting a difference. So, there can be differences.

Two types of attitudes basically arise out of it. One is to identify in a trans-border situation or create a trans-border identification, basically. The other is to demarcate and

kind of reify the border, remember certain differences, and assert these differences. So, as a way of saying that we are similar but not quite the same. So, border relations are concerned with the shifting discourses of border identities at different levels.

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- Borderland governance immediately involves inter-state relations, transborder interactions, compatibility and incompatibility (of social, political, and economic systems), value and ideological differences, power asymmetry, identity shifts, and constant mobility
- Yuk Wah Chan (2013) and Caroline Grillot (2012) suggest that while one may assume that at border areas, frequent interaction across borders will bring familiarity of interchangeable identities and mixed ways of living; yet border areas also witness the worst types of stereotypes and conflicts due to intensified border interactions
- The contingency of border realities can lead to rigidities of identity as well as to hybridization, which "define" people and are "used" by the people as well. Border relations are concerned with the shifting discourses of border identities at different levels (individuals, families, specific groups, and the state), and how they affect daily border-crossing, interaction, and livelihood



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These levels could be individuals, families, specific social groups, as well as the state, and how these border identities affect daily border crossing, interaction, and livelihood. Border crossing mobility necessarily evokes negotiation and contestation of interests, ideologies, status, and identity. So, borders generate new social spaces, which can be real or imagined, and at the same time, borders split social spaces. This is to say that crossing a border and entering a new land, a host land, as a refugee or as a mohajir, is certainly a fall in status. It means that I have come to a new land in terms of have-not.

I have to refurbish my citizenry, my status of citizenship, right? It means that... Some of my interests will now be jeopardized or controlled by the new nation state. My refurbishing, my rebuilding of identity, will be at the behest of the national policies of the new nation state where I have entered. So, borders generate new social spaces.

When a refugee comes to a host land, many times the refugee colonies create their own heterotopia where the culture is very different from the host culture, and this heterotopian or heterotopic identity or habitat is very consciously constructed as a way of not forgetting the tradition from where or the culture, the background from where one has come, as a way of retaining some elements of one's own homeland. This is something very much observable among the refugee communities, right? So, a border can be defined as a state's intervention into overlapping social domains, such that family, business, religion, and livelihood can all be separated through a border for the sake of establishing and validating sovereignty.

For the sake of validating sovereignty, a line can cut across business, religion, even homes, even families, even rivers. So, the implementation of border control renders ambiguity to the legalized and institutionalized framework for border crossing. Borderline families actively conduct border crossings and make trans-border familial connections and personalize trading relationships, thereby continuously creating trans-local social spaces for which legalization may or may not cater. So, there is on the one hand a legalized and institutionalized framework for border crossing, and on the other hand, subterranean, localized agreements or cultures of trans-local social spaces where legalization may not cater, may not even apply. Critics E.C.

Chapman and Grant Evans suggest that Asian borderlands offer a peculiar landscape, for understanding governance and development. This is not only because many of these borderlands have been sites for political struggles and military conflicts, but they are also spaces that have witnessed many shifts and shuffles of powers and regimes of regulation across decades and centuries. While some of these borderlands still carry the legacies of colonialism, Others were once closed or semi-closed and later reopened in recent years.

So, it's also about the nature of a geopolitical region's politics. It depends on South Asia's politics, how, for example, the China-Tibet border is functioning, how the Indo-Pak border and commerce are functioning, how the Indo-Bangladesh commerce and trade are functioning. It all depends on the politics of that region, right. Borderlands are deeply affected by the contingent, by contemporary politics.

They are also now and then under stress due to contingent political struggles and diplomatic standstills. Like I said, if there is an outbreak of war, if there is an attempt at invading territory, a conquest, or the diplomatic relationship is at a dead end somehow, then the border areas certainly suffer a lot. At times when political divides have been mended successfully, The borderlands can act as, you know, growth regions. So, good international relations can kind of reflect on the thriving borderland cultures.

When international relations are smooth and amicable, it reflects a thriving borderland. And a flourishing borderland culture. The borderlands are booming with future possibilities in terms of social development, commerce, as well as education. Asia accommodates extremely diverse political and economic systems. Borderlands in Asia are mostly quick to exploit or capitalize on newly developed

borderland political economies, thereby improving their life chances and livelihoods. They capitalize on borderland political economies to develop and improve their life

chances. The borderlanders are very much dependent on the political economies of the borderland. Understanding the concept of asymmetries of power and identities in the borderlands entails opening the prism of asymmetric relationships at borderlands, which results in multiple overlapping time-space domains and metaphors. Borderlands are not very easy places.

We must understand there are multiple time-space domains and metaphors overlapping in these regions. They cannot be handled in the same manner as mainland culture and the issues and problems associated with the mainland. Their own political economies and local issues need to be examined separately and with a unique approach. Borders are not just hard territorial lines. They are institutions resulting from bordering policies.

They are, therefore, about people. So, borders are not impersonal, hard territorial lines. They are about people, and for most settled territories, they are predominantly about inclusion and exclusion. When we draw or demarcate a border, We intend to include a community within the part of a given nation, and in the same tone, we are excluding certain people from the territory of that nation.

A nation emerges through the question of inclusion and exclusion, as they are woven into varied cultural, economic, and political fabrics. So, borderlands are not just territorial lines; they are institutions that result from bordering policies, and at the ground level, they are about people. They are not impersonal spaces or places. For most settled territories, they are predominantly about inclusion and exclusion. We understand that when borders are demarcated to form a nation-state,

A national community is identified or consolidated by including certain people and, in the same tone, by excluding others who are part of other nation-states. So, this game—or this ploy—of inclusion and exclusion is instrumental in shaping a national community. And so, borders are, therefore, woven into varied cultural, economic, and political fabrics. Bounded territories and borderlands are the outcomes of continual interactions and intersections between the actions of people on the one hand and the constraints and limits placed by contextual and structural factors on the other. So, borderlands are shaped by two things.

There is a pre-given, ostensibly ossified structure of borders as hard territorial lines, and then in practice, there is the people's agency, which constantly disrupts such lines through everyday activities as a way of boosting their own sustenance and survival. So, our understanding of borders is defined by what Yosef Lapid calls the territorialist

epistemology. Borders started as Roman limits built of stone or turf in North Africa, Germany, and Britain because Romans viewed boundaries as markers between sovereign states and also enjoyed world hegemony. The Roman lines represent the borders of the Roman Empire at its greatest extent in the second century AD. These lines stretched over 5,000 kilometers from the Atlantic coast of Northern Britain through Europe to the Black Sea, and from there to the Red Sea and across North Africa to the Atlantic coast.

The vestiges of the lines today comprise relics of built walls, ditches, forts, fortresses, watchtowers, and civilian settlements. So, borders are no longer only about territorially bounded authorities. We have to understand that they are not just sea and airports of entry or border crossings. Borders are increasingly also about virtual or simply impalpable borders. Here, we are talking about electronic borders, non-visible borders, biometric identification control, as well as electronic devices that are set to track flows of goods and people, such as tracking financial transactions, spyware of all kinds, and so forth.

Etienne Balibar suggests that borders are, to quote Balibar, 'vacillating, multiplied, and reduced in their localization, thinned out and doubled, no longer the shores of politics but the space of the political itself.' So, to put it in a nutshell, there is a growing literature that is now published, suggesting that we need to develop our understanding of borders, which goes beyond our territorialist and geopolitical, intellectual and political traditions and dimensions. So, increasingly, our understanding of bordering processes and policies tends to revisit or question our traditional conceptualization of borders. To understand borders and borderlands, we need to focus on the agency of borders.

which is marked by activities of social, economic and political individuals, as well as the processes of production and reproduction of borders. Here we are talking about the bordering and de-bordering praxis, which at a given time in history and within a given space are economically, politically and economically culturally defined and embedded. These practices are defined or churned out of economic, political, and cultural immediacy, right? The instantaneous meaning of economic, political, and cultural dynamics are reflected through the processes, the practices of bordering and de-bordering.

In today's time, the non-territorial borders are not always located in borderlands. For instance, processes of preclearance of goods or people may be done anywhere but at the boundary line where they often make the least sense. This is very paradoxical actually.

The preclearance of goods and people are not actually and always happening at the boundary line where we think they happen.

Moreover, borders are shaped through competing production and reproduction practices that are fundamentally rooted in individual actions and therefore, they are deeply associated with economic, political and cultural interests and motivations. As a way of concluding our lecture today, we have this flowchart where we are looking at different analytical lengths which may enhance another to integrate or disintegrate the borderland. So, different lengths include the local cross-border culture, the policy activities of multiple levels of government. The local cross-border political clout and then the market forces and trade flows, these are all interspersed and interrelated. So, the local cross-border culture speaks to political activities and local cross-border political clout.

Similarly, local cross-border political clout is closely connected with the question of market forces and trade flows. So, when we talk about local cross-border culture, we are looking at the sense of belonging and a common language of ethnic, religious, and socio-economic backgrounds that span the border and borderland. When we talk about policy activities of multiple levels of government, we mean multiple governance structures that span the border to link local, regional, provincial, state, and central governments, as well as task-specific public and private sector organizations. When we talk about local cross-border political clout, we refer to active local civic and political organizations and individuals who initiate and expand local-level relations, local policy networks, local policy communities, and symbolic regimes.

And finally, when we talk about market forces and trade flows, we refer to flows of goods, people, and investments. So, all these are very important, closely connected as a network, as a nexus. We cannot separate the question of cross-border culture from cross-border politics, nor cross-border politics from policymaking at multiple levels of government.

And all these, in turn, are connected to market forces and trade flows. So, with this, we come to the end of our lecture today. Let us meet for another topic and a new set of discussions in our next lecture. Thank you.