

Sociological Perspectives on Modernity
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Lecture – 11
Sociological Modernism: Marx vs. Weber

Welcome to the eleventh lecture of the course on sociological perspectives on modernity. Before dwelling upon the structuralist interpretation of the critical modernist paradigm in sociology, it is important to revise to recapitulate whatever we have discussed in the context of the classic statements about critical modernist paradigm in sociology namely Marx on modernity and weber on modernity.

Very quickly in this lecture, we will try to cover we will try to recapitulate the classic statements about sociological modernity. Let us first start with Marx on majority, but Marx's views about modernity that we have already discussed, it requires certain methodological warnings I mean when we discuss Marx on modernity, Marx on modernity cannot be isolated from Marx's method itself.

Marx's theoretical positions themselves Marx's method includes materialist conception of history that we have already discussed, that matter is prior to the formation of idea, I mean Marx said in refers to a contribution to critique of political economy, that it is not the consciousness of men that determines their big, but on the contrary their social existence that determines their consciousness.


I mean then the principles of dialectic, I mean the interpenetration of the opposites quantitative changes lead to qualitative changes, and the law of negation of negation, and the theory of ideology when I say theory of ideology Marx has to be evaluated not simply as Marx as an idea log of the communist party, but also Marx as a theorist and theory of knowledge theory of science because science is one of the markers of modernity in the context of the enlightenment in the context of the industrial revolution and so on.

Let us first then we are going to discuss these four parameters; one is materialist conception of history, dialectic, theory of ideology, and theory of science or knowledge I mean we have already discussed these things in part, but now we will try to recapitulate

the views on modernity by both Marx and Weber. Let us first start with Marx's materialist conception of history or popularly known as historical materialism. Marx's historical materialism I mean can be figured out through his work on a preface to a critique contribution to a critique of political economy of 1859.

For example, Nikos Bollinger's has provided a threefold classification of the concepts of the concepts specific to historical materialism.

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Marx on modernity:

- Marx's view on modernity is deeply shaped by own involvement in the Europe of his day.
- A political activist – involved with radical and socialist organisations in Britain and France as well as in the first socialist International.
- Most importantly, though, was his intense intellectual involvement with his own society.
- The collected works of Marx and Engels run to over 40 volumes on social philosophy, economic analysis and political comment, which taken together represent a phenomenal amount of empirical research.

I mean what is that threefold classification of the concept specific to historical materialism. I mean Marx's historical materialism first historical materialism. First historical materialism is a theory of history on condition, that certain of its concepts are trans historical that is to say they have some valid applicability in all historical forms of society.

Whether it is slavery or feudalism or capitalism it is always the relationship between labor and capital, it is the relationship between labor of those who between those who sell their labor and those who live off live off their level. Those who sell their labor power on the one hand and those who own the means of production ok.

That is why it is trans historical in nature, it is you will find similar kind of tendency in all historical stages of society. Be it slavery or feudalism or capitalism I mean such

concepts include modes of production, raw materials, instruments and relations the production, property relations and relations of appropriation labor and social formation.

I mean possibly the concepts of a theory of transition between social formations and the concepts of the different structural levels, within a mode of production and social formation. When I say social formation I mean the political, the ideological and the economic (Refer Time: 07:24) calls the theoretical structure formed by these concepts, the general theory of historical materialism.

Then it is very important to understand I mean the first point that that historical materialism is a theory of history on the condition on the premise, that certain of its concepts are trans historical in nature. That is to say that they have some valid applicability in historical forms of society, and these concepts include modes of production raw materials instruments and relations of products and property relations, and relations of real appropriation labor and capital furnace and possibly the concepts of a theory of transition between social formation, and the concepts of the different structural levels within a mode of production and social formation, namely the political the ideological and the economic ok.

This is known as a general the I mean this is the it is called the it this is known as the theoretical structure formed by the concepts I mean the general theory of historical materialism. Then what is historical in historical materialism and what is materialism in historical materialism? It is very important to know what is historical in historical materialism.

Historical the term historical entailed the analysis of how particular forms of society have had had come into existence, and the specific historical contexts within which apparently universal or eternal social forms were located. Then historical entailed the analysis of how particular forms of society had come into existence and the specific historical contexts, within which apparently not really apparently universal social or universal or apparently universal social forms or apparently eternal social forms, where located what are they?

They appear to us as universal, eternal they are not going to die out they are not going to disappear they are going to exist here for all time to come it appears to us that, but actually it is not who what they let me give you a few examples of which appear to us as

universal or eternal social forms, but actually it is not. Let me give you a few examples I mean the state religion market and so on ok.

It appears for Marx it appears to us that the state is going to exist for all time to come, the market is going to exist for all time to come religion is going to exist for all time to come it appears to us, but actually they are not they are going to disappear ok, but we have to understand the historical contexts against the I mean we have to understand the specific historical contexts, within which these apparently universal or eternal social forms are located or situated then what is materialism in historical materialism. Now materialism denoted the rejection of Hegelian ideology and the primacy of socio economic processes and relations.

Materialism denotes the rejection of Hegelian ideology, I mean Hegelian idealism suggested that no ideas are prior to the formation of matter whereas; Marx's materialism suggests that no ideas are not prior to the formation of matter rather matter is prior to the formation of ideology. In what sense now when we place our socioeconomic processes and relations on a higher pedestal Vasavi other political ideological processes and so on this is the first then.

Then what is the second one? I mean secondly, their particular there are the particular theory is whose concepts provide the theoretical analysis of each of the modes of production. This is important I mean there are certain particular theories whose concepts provide the theoretical analysis of each of the modes of production namely hunting and gathering economies, slavery, feudalism, capitalism socialism and communism, which I which are identified in the in the general theory of historical materialism. That the particular theory of the capitalist mode of production includes as constituent concepts of the concept of commodity, the distinction between use.

And exchange value, the distinction between labor and labor power, the concepts of money and of capital itself and the distinctions between constant capital and variable capital, and between value and surplus value and the concepts of profit interest and capitalist ground rent and also the concepts of new economic structures, and in namely what are these new economic structures, I mean ideological structures and political structures ok.

Which are characteristic of the capitalist mode of production, it is also important to understand the significance of trade unions political parties are definite ranged of forms of the state, and a specific form of family and so on. Then first we discussed in the first point Marx's materialist conception of history, that Marx's has historical materialism is a theory of history on the condition that certain of its concepts are trans historical in nature, that is to say that they have some valid applicability in all historical forms of society, I mean the general theory of historical materialism.

Secondly there are the particular theories whose concepts provide this theoretical analysis of each of the modes of production, namely hunting and gathering, economies slavery, feudalism, capitalism, socialism and communism which are identified in the general theory of historical materialism. And the particular theory of the capitalist mode of production includes different concepts commodity; what is a commodity that has got exchanged value may not have use value, but it must have exchangeable the that is why the distinction between use value and exchange value is important, the distinction between labor and labor power is important ok.

The concepts of money and of capital what is the difference between wealth and capital wealth is a stock whereas, capital is a flow the distinctions between variable and constant capital, that is why we talked we have already discussed how only labor is very important in Ricardian or and Marx's is theory of value., labor is very important because land is considered constant capital or fixed capital, labor is a variable capital.

Capital itself is generated through labor and entrepreneur is one more level. Then the distinction between value and surplus value, surplus labor mean if one unit of labor earns 100 rupees or 80 rupees for 8 hours of work a day, then for overtime if she or he is getting engaged in overtime activities, then then the ways gets reduced. In fact, that surplus way ok.

The concept of profit interest and rent capitalist ground reigned, they are owned by they are handled by they are appropriated by very few individuals in the society, a few groups in the society leaving the large masses large population huge population with many impoverishment. These are and also the concepts of new economics structures I mean political in geological and so on ok.

They are very much characteristics of capitalist mode of production, and it is also in this context it is very important to understand the significance of trade unions civil society political parties and so on and also the state the nature of the state specific form of family and so on. And thirdly there are what Bollinger's calls regional theory ok.

I mean what are this regional theory the I mean that is why Marx also talked about a static mode of production. It is very important to understand that the kind of mode of production that we witnessed today we witness in Europe or North American continuing, we do not tend to see that kind of mode of production in India or Latin America or Africa it requires we must ensure to develop certain regional theories which are of particular structural levels or regions within each mode of production then then there are three important elements, I mean that the as Nicos Bollinger's has provided a threefold classification of the concepts of concept specific to historical materialism ok.

First Marx's historical materialism is a i theory of history on the condition that certain of its concepts are trans historical in nature, that is to say that they have some valid applicability in all historical forms of society. I mean general theory of historical materialism we have also discussed what is historical in historical materialism and materialism in historical materialism ok.

Secondly there are particular theories whose concepts provide the theoretical analysis of each of the modes of production namely hunting and gathering economy, slavery feudalism, capitalism, socialism and communism which are identified in the general theory of historical materialism and I mean that this this particular theory of the capitalist mode of production ok includes as constituent concepts; the concept of commodity, the distinction between use and exchange value the distinction between labor and labor power, the concepts of money and of capital itself, the distinctions between variable and constant capital between value and surplus value the concepts of profit reigned and the capitalist ground reigned and also the concepts of new economic structures characteristic of the capitalist mode of production, trade unions political parties are definite range of forms of state of specific forms of a specific form of family and so on.

And thirdly there are what Bollinger's called regional theories, I mean these regional theories are of the particular structural levels or regions within each mode of production. This is broadly materialist conception of history or Marx,s materialist conception of

history, then then then what is the what are the principles of dialectic, what is dialectic first of all popularly known as dialectical materialism; that the term dialectic refers to the art of a dialogue in the form of an argumentation. It expresses I mean the term dialectic expresses the view that development depends on the class of contradictions or the creation of a new more advanced synthesis out of these classes out of these contradictions out of these conflicts ok.

The dialectical process involves three movements one thesis, antithesis and synthesis. And Marx used the notion of dialectic to account for social and historical events, but Engels extended the scope of dialectical analysis so far to establish it as a general law of development that applied equally into social natural and intellectual fields ok.

I mean particularly Engels who is very much influenced by the works of George Darvey the biologist that is why it is very important to understand how Engels was deeply engrossed in the dialectics of nature. I mean Engels in fact, believed that the real world whether of society or of nature, developed according to dialectal sequences of contradictions and synthesis and that the dialectical logic was the means by which one could comprehend this development. How did Marx and weber come to this point? I mean drawing lessons from hegels dialectic and fire backs materialism.

Both Marx and Engels have propounded the principles of dialectical and historical materialism I mean the principles of dialectic and materialist conception of history. When Engels was deeply engrossed in the dialectic of nature, Marx found out their social applicability in the course of the development of human society. The principles of dialectical materialism means salt are the interpenetration of the opposites or unity and struggle of opposites. Secondly, quantitative changes lead to qualitative changes and vice versa, I mean quantitative changes lead to qualitative changes and qualitative changes also lead to quantitative changes, and the principle of I mean the law of I mean the theory of negation of negation ok.

I mean if you look at this the principles of dialectic for Marx, human history is a part of history of nature, it is basically a movement of nature developing towards man towards human mix. Marx always spoke about the unity of science, I mean man of science man of nature and so on. According to Marx science will in time incorporate into itself the science of man just as science of man will incorporate into itself the science of nature,

this I mean at the end of there will be once I mean the social reality of nature and natural science of human beings are identical terms. I mean then how to understand nature? I mean for Marx human beings are the immediate objects of natural sciences and nature is the immediate object of science of human beings human species ok.

How do I relate that, how did he arrive at that, I mean for him for Marx since perceptions are the basis of all sciences same censuses of man is human consciousness and consciousness is looked at only by looking at others. I mean suppose man a looks at man b man b also looks at man a I mean women a looks at woman b, woman b looks at women a. I mean consciousness is looked at only by looking at others. For Marx human actions changed the world, human actions changed nature that is why in in in man nature relationship.

We have already discussed I mean there are different things that are earlier literature suggests that nature controls, but I mean what are what is what was the role of human beings human beings were supposed to only contemplate on nature, but subsequently civilization also taught us how human being started controlling nature. There is a shift from faculty of contemplation to faculty of control that is why for Marx human beings change the world human beings change the nature.

Marx emphasized what is the basis of this; Marx emphasized the notion of practices. The single science refers to the science of history I mean history of nature and history of man condition is an history of nature and history of human species condition each other there is always a dialectical process. According to Marx human beings live in and against nature, human beings not only depend on nature for their survival, but also know how to control it how to master over nature that is why according to Marx human beings live in live I mean human beings live in and against nature ok.

And knowledge comes from this kind of conflict with and by acting upon nature that is why Marx said by acting upon nature human beings not only changed nature, but also changed the social relationships involved in it. Human beings by acting upon nature human beings not only changed nature, but also change themselves. It is only through practice that we know and change the world. It is only through practice, we know and change nature it in this context as a towering figure from peoples republic of China (Refer Time: 30:20) who said that the proof of apple is in it city.

The I mean it is an empirical way of looking at the trajectory of development, and this this this the it involves the dialectical process I mean practice through practice we know and change nature by changing by knowing as well as changing nature, we create knowledge and this new form of knowledge and or these new forms of knowledge, they also change human nature. That is why by acting upon nature human beings not only change nature, but also change themselves. According to (Refer Time: 31:13) multiplicity of contradictions are hierarchical in a social formation some principal contradictions subordinate several other contradictions ok.

Suppose for Marx nature does not build machines, machines are the products of human activity, machines are the products of human action human labor. I mean that is why Marx said that who has first created machines earlier literature used to attribute the creation of machines to some supernatural forces, I mean god. In this context Marx interrogated this idea and Marx challenged this idea, I mean Marx came up with a more modern view about this new order of society that no machines I mean nature does not build machines, god has not built machines.

It machines are the products of human labor, human activity, human action. In this context Marx said that Darwin has got made redundant, it is only through human labor human activity human action that that we have created this world we have tried to not only know this world, but also we have attempted to be this world ok. Capitalism limits civilizing force of science, in capitalism in capitalist mode of production as Marx suggested that I mean that nature becomes denatured, and humanity becomes dehumanized and nature becomes a raw material and object of utility.

I mean it is important to humanize nature and naturalized human beings which does not happen in capitalism for Marx. For Marx in in capitalism nature becomes denature, and humanity becomes dehumanized and nature because nature is reduced to a raw material an object of utility. Understanding life at a molecular level will be reductionist understanding life at a genetic level will be reductionist. If this is so, then ideologically much of Marx's and Engels discussion on ideology is metaphorical in character, we are now coming to theory of ideology by Marx. I mean what are ideologies for Marx ideologies are fantasies illusions, myths, reflections inverted images echoes of material life and so on.

Many, but not all of these metaphors contain two theses about etiology. Marx has a theories I am not talking about Marx such an ideologue of the communist party, but Marx as a theoritism. Many, but not all of these metaphors contain two theses of about ideology. I mean ideologies as fantasies illusions myths reflections inverted images echoes of material life and so on. It these metaphors contain two theses about etiology, one thesis s concerns its status as your reality the other it statuses knowledge, when I say knowledge I mean co it is cognitive status.


For Marx there are one way causal relations causal links between material life and ideology, that ideology and insubstantial epiphenomenon I mean that is a reflection which depicts, but there is not affect the course of real historical life. Insubstantial epiphenomenon; in the German ideology Marx said that materialism consists in asserting that thoughts are the phenomena material life are the phenomenon a material life their essence as against the idealists assertion of the converse.

I mean I idealists asserted that no I mean there must be determination in the last instance or and relative autonomy of the superstructures are clearly attempts to correct these lapses into economic reduction is. For Marx if ideology is the dependent variable I mean if ideology is the effect then mode of production is the independent variable or the Koch, but and for Marx in quest of truth, Marx as a theoricity in quest of truth, in quest of knowledge one has to go beyond the narrow confinements of her or his ideology.

Once you move away from ideology, once you go move away from the narrow confinements of your ideology then you confront science, therein lies the beauty of Marx's theory of science or theory of knowledge. The theory of science or the theory of knowledge I mean Marx's theory of science or theory of knowledge can be understood by analyzing and explicit and explaining two of Marx's texts on scientific methodology what are those two ok.

The first one the German ideology and the second one the methods of political economy. From these two texts the German ideology on the one hand and the methods of political economy on the other, I mean six theses for this is very important. I mean German ideology because German he was guided much by German philosophy and methods of political economy I mean British economy mean.

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These to are very important what are what are those six theses which follow from these two texts on the German ideology and the methods of political economy. First the positive science of history is the representation of the practical activity of the practical process of development of human beings. The first one the positive science of history is the representation of the practical activity, everything emanates from praxis practice and such representation or depiction consists in the observation and arrangement of historical material, under the guidance of certain premises, certain conditions, certain starting points ok.

Which are themselves to be made evident by the study of the material life of each historical epoch, then what are these premises the stating points, these conditions? Premises in this sense are the axioms or first principles of the theoretical system of history and this is the third one I mean premises thirdly premises are the axioms or first principles of the theoretical system of history. Fourthly the term promises refers to stating points in the real world from which the concrete study of history must proceed and these premises are basic facts of social life.

I mean what are those basic facts of social life I mean maybe the individual the real individuals their activity and the material conditions under which they live, and these premises I mean the given the raw data of scientific historical investigation can be verified in a purely empirical way and are empirically perceptible. Fifthly the materialist

method of knowledge production for Marx differs from that of the empiricists. Crude empiricists for whom history is a collection of dead facts that is why materialist method again is different from empirical method ok.

Not only that sixthly; not only that sixthly what Marx went further that that the materialistic method is not speculative as metaphysicists to. Instead the materialist methods always starts with observable and verifiable facts; why the materialist method is not speculative as metaphysicist to know precisely because the premises of metaphysics or the (Refer Time: 41:56) to existing philosophical investigations governed by the metaphysical school of thought, they govern the premises of metaphysics govern empirical investigations, next why the materialist method after always starts with observable and verifiable facts ok.

Keeping this the broad contours of Marx's historical materialism, that I mean the Marx's materialist conception of history, the principles of dialectic theory of ideology, and end theory of science or theory of knowledge, let us quickly look at Weber's reflection on modernity.

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Max Weber's Methodology

- Weber contributed heavily to the development of substantive sociological theory and to the debate on methodology.
- Weber's methodological writings are usually characterised as effecting a reconciliation between

Positivism Neo-Kantianism

The slide features a central portrait of Max Weber. Two red arrows point from the top of the portrait to two boxes: a red box labeled 'Positivism' on the left and a purple box labeled 'Neo-Kantianism' on the right. The background is a light blue gradient.

We are just trying to recapitulate before we move on to the structuralist interpretation of modernity by (Refer Time: 43:01) and (Refer Time: 43:03) now what how weber did it, I mean weber contributed heavily to the development of substantive sociological theory and to the debate on methodology. Weber's methodological writings and

theoretical positions are usually characterized as affecting reconciliation between positivism for between positivist and Neo-Kantiansim positions.

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- Though Weber's positions were not, of course, entirely consistent throughout his life, it is possible to say that, in general, Weber rejected the view attributable to some neo-Kantians (though not Rickert) that the cultural sciences are exclusively concerned with the uniqueness of their objects of study, and that the category of causality is inapplicable in them.
- Weber was committed to neo-Kantian insistence on the methodological peculiarities of the cultural sciences.
- For Weber, these peculiarities centered around the **two** related concepts:

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graph TD; A[Value-relevance] --- B[Interpretative understanding];
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
The slide features a blue background with white text. At the bottom, there is a small portrait of Max Weber. The diagram consists of two rectangular boxes, one on the left labeled 'Value-relevance' and one on the right labeled 'Interpretative understanding'. A thin blue line connects the top corners of these two boxes, with a small downward-pointing arrowhead in the center. Below the portrait, there is a Windows taskbar with various icons and the date '12/1 10/19/2017'.

Though Weber's positions were not of course, entirely consistent throughout his life, it is possible to say that in general he rejected the view attributable to some neo-Kantiansim that the cultural sciences are exclusively concerned with the uniqueness of the objects of study, and that the category of causality is inapplicable in them.

Weber was committed to the widespread neo Kantian insistence on the methodological peculiarities of the cultural sciences. For weber these peculiarities centered around the two related concepts of alue relevance.

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- For Weber, the cultural sciences differ from the natural sciences in the distinctive role of valuations in the formation of concepts, and in the distinctive type of knowledge involved in them.
- A **third** area of methodological differences was thought by Weber to be the use of 'idealizations' in the cultural sciences.




And interpretive understanding I mean the cultural sciences differed from the natural in the distinctive role of valuations in the formation of concepts and in the distinctive type of knowledge involving them. And the third area of methodological differences was taught by weber to be the use of idealizations in the cultural senses.

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Interpretative Sociology

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
'Sociology (in the sense in which this highly ambiguous word is used here) is a **science** which attempts the **interpretive understanding of social action** in order thereby to arrive at a **causal explanation** of its course and effects.'



Weber's famous definition of interpretive sociology encapsulates most of such points as sociology is a science which attempts the interpretive understanding of social action in


order by to arrive, at a causal explanation of its course and effects and exposition of you know Weber's methodological position can usefully proceed.

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With an analysis of each of the concepts and contrasts involved in the definition.


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First the concept of social action, that the characterization of sociology in terms of the understanding and explanation of social action involves two important contrasts. First weber is distinguishing the paradigmatic objects of sociological knowledge for him, from

the supra individual social entities, whose existence is supposed in much sociological theorizing and also everyday thinking about social relations.


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Weber does not actually deny the existence of such supra individual social supra individual social entities, but argues that for interpretative sociology, they must be such a supra individual social entities must be treated, as solely the resultants and modes of organization of the particular acts of individual persons.


Webbers position here would now be regarded as methodological individualist involving the claim that in so far, as collectivities may be said to have characteristics independent of the individuals which make them up.

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Those characteristics are to be explained in terms of individual actors and their actions. Then then such methodological individualist position refers to theoretical position holding that adequate sociological accounts necessarily involved reference to individuals, their interpretations of their circumstances, and the reasons and motives for the actions that they take. Weber says that such action by no means necessarily follows from the sharing of a common class situation.


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Prima facie interpreting sociology refers to a variety of forms of sociology ignited by an emphasis on the necessity for sociologists, to grasp or understand or interpret actors meanings.

It can legitimately interpret course x I mean it can legitimately interpret course of action in terms of concepts, such as the state classes etcetera without commitment to any of the entities. Interpretive understanding I mean it refers to a method that stresses the importance of understanding of intentional human action.

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
I mean semantically any account is an interpretation, that is why we have already discussed how; however, considered understanding to be a method of elucidating the motivations for action which did not pollute the sociologists making generalizations from this data. In some whilst this there is a general commitment to empathy and understanding from the actors point of view the research that flows from interpretation, is so, varied as to be difficult to categorize as a school possibly because the meaning of interpretation is itself subject to interpretation. Verstehen for weber is not a method at all.

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- **Verstehen** is not a method at all but an 'objective', an 'achievement' – it is a distinctive type of knowledge which may be achieved by a variety of methods, or no 'method' at all.
- For Weber, the concept of '**Verstehen**' refers primarily to the spontaneous and immediate 'recognition' of acts and their meanings in everyday life.

But an objective or an achievement or a goal it is a distinctive type of knowledge which may be achieved by a variety of methods or no method at all. I mean for Weber the concept of Verstehen or understanding refers primarily to the spontaneous and immediate recognition of acts and their meanings in everyday life ok.


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And we have we have also discussed how interpretive understanding of social action has two parts, I mean interpretation at the of the textual and linguistic meaning of a cultural


product on the one hand and value interpretation. I mean when I say value be it social value aesthetic value or cognitive value.

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
I mean values for a sociologist are always objects of study. Interpretive understanding may be direct understanding or observational understanding and indirect understanding or explanatory understanding we have also discussed a rule governed said culture which is based on relevance acceptability and elegance.

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
We have discussed how explanation I mean when we talk about indirect or explanatory understanding.

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How explanation must be adequate at the level of meaning as well as at the level of statistical generalizations, I mean adequacy is based on generalizations and generalizations are based on experience.

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


And the central dimensions of Webbers analysis are that economic religious and power relations are crucial sociological explanations on the basis of which weber made three

types of economic phenomena, I mean economic phenomena, economically relevant phenomena and economically conditioned phenomena. Economic phenomena when weber referred to I mean institutions deliberately created and used for economic ends I mean market.


Economically relevant phenomena I mean legal and religious phenomena which are not primarily economic, but have consequences which are economic in nature in certain circumstances. I mean when weber talked about economically conditioned phenomena, I mean he referred to the stratification systems and the state are not directly the economic phenomena, but are affected in some way by the economic phenomena.

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That is why weber said that economy and religion cannot be separated in our day to day life so far as practice is concerned ok.

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


Weber's Interpretation of Modernity
Holism / Totality

- Marx is not a Sociologist in the disciplinary sense for the simple reason that he is not an academic.
- Weber is, or rather became, a Sociologist, because he is living and working as an academic at the point where sociology is developing as a separate discipline.
- Indeed, Weber moves from the study of law, political economy and history to an identity as a Sociologist.

Then we have discussed Weber's interpretation of modernity as well as Marx's web interpretation of modernity through the lenses of holism or totality reflexivity, rationality h, and social movements ok.

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


The other major difference which Weber brings to his analysis of social movements is the concept of **Social Closure**. Weber treats social closure as a process whereby groups aim at restricting access to particularly desirable things – occupations, goods, status or whatever – to themselves.

Much of Weber's writing deals with the extent to which successful collective action results in this kind of social closure for the sake of exercising a monopoly on something: in recent years neo-Weberians such as Frank Parkin have argued that access to political power itself is such a good, and that a major aim of collective action is to move from an "outsider" status of exclusion to an "insider" status where the group enjoys a monopoly of influence on political power on the issues that are important to it.

And we have also discussed they there are two primary differences between weber and Marx on class.

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Two primary differences between Weber and Marx on class:

The first is in their conception of the economic class structure that underlies class movements. For Marx, we have seen, this can ultimately be reduced to a primary opposition between the exploited and the exploiters, those who labour and those who live off their labour. For Weber, however, economic situation is not so much a relationship as a given, which individuals bring to a market. Schematically, we can say that individuals bring their labour-power, or their skills, or their ownership of the means of production to a market; and it is this market situation, for Weber, that generates the “**life-chances**” of each individual. In other words, Weber’s economic classes are more heterogeneous and less interactive than Marx’s; this conception, at least, cannot be said to be holistic.

I mean the first is in their conception of the economic class structure, that underlies class movements, I mean for Marx classes are manifestations of economic differentiation, but for weber classes are contingent upon life chances as well as causal components for Marx we have as we have seen this I mean the conception of the economic class structure that underlies class movements, can ultimately be reduced to a primary opposition between the exploited and the exploiters those who live, those who labor as well as those who live of their labor.


For weber; however, economic situation is not so much a relationship as a given which individuals bring to a market. Systematically we can say that individuals bring their labor power of their skills or their ownership the means of production to a market, and it is this market situation for weber that generates the life chances of each individual. I mean for weber economic classes are more heterogeneous, and less interactive then then what Marx had envisioned ok.

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- The other major difference which Weber brings to his analysis of social movements is the concept of **Social Closure**. Weber treats social closure as a process whereby groups aim at restricting access to particularly desirable things – occupations, goods, status or whatever – to themselves.
- Much of Weber's writing deals with the extent to which successful collective action results in this kind of social closure for the sake of exercising a monopoly on something: in recent years neo-Weberians such as Frank Parkin have argued that access to political power itself is such a good, and that a major aim of collective action is to move from an "outsider" status of exclusion to an "insider" status where the group enjoys a monopoly of influence on political power on the issues that are important to it.

And. Secondly, the I mean the other major difference which weber brings to his analysis of social movements is the concept of social closer. Weber treats social closer as a process whereby groups aim at restricting access to particularly desirable things, namely occupations goods status and so on. Much of Weber's writing deals with the extent to which successful collective action results in this kind of social closer for the sake of exercising a monopoly on something.


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This is very important and we have also discussed Weber's ideal types I mean which are the models, which describe rules of the way things happen in a way that makes sense to us.


Thus we might construct an ideal typical description of the way in which religions founded by a charismatic priest, become over time highly structured and militant organizations. And the relationship of this model to the way things actually happen is then variable. In general weber says that it helps us develop these models act as abstracted or level as possible. So, that the concepts become as unambiguous as possible and their interrelationship is as clear as possible, and these ideal types are then they do become yardsticks against which we can measure what actually happened ok.

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In other words the ideal type is a general description of a particular logical of process or of a rational sequence of events, in the sense of one where their sequence has a meaning clearly, they will be far easier in the case of value rational or goal rational sequences since an assumption continued custom tells us very little about the content of the custom, and assumptions that emotions follow particular sequences are very risky. In other words it is rationality itself whether goal rational or value rational that makes interpretation possible on the basis of a shared and reflexive participation in the social world.

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


And beyond the specific case of case of rationalization as a general process in modernity, then rationality for weber is your concept which bridges the gap between sociology and its objects.

I mean I mean for example, rationality in either form is present as a tendency within society which may be approximated to a greater or lesser extent, I mean the sociologists can use this tendential rationality to make more sense of the actual process or events. Clearly then the more rationalized society becomes the deeper into modernity we go, the easier the social resists task should become and the closer their interpretations should correspond with what actually happens.

I mean in the next lecture we are going to discuss the ultra-modernist case.

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Ultra-modernism: The Structuralist Interpretation

- Structuralism's claim to be considered a form to *critical* modernism – more *tenuous*.
- While much structuralism claims to be “Marxist”, very often it appears rather more as an incorporation of Marxism into a rather more affirmative form of modernism.
- This is particularly evident in the difficulties structuralist thought faces in coming to terms with reflexivity, as well as its consequent explicit or implicit flirtation with positivism.

I mean the structuralist interpretation of the critical I mean the central pillars, the central political and philosophical foundations of modernist paradigm in sociology. I mean in the in the works of Levi Strauss and Louis Althusser what we will do, I mean we will we will simultaneously discuss Levi Strauss and althusser, I mean first well go one by one and then we will examine simultaneously both of both their works through the lenses of these centered pillars of modernity, I mean holism or totality reflexivity rationality and social movements.

Thank you.