


Logic for CS
Prof. Dr. S. Arun Kumar
Department of Computer Science
Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi

Lecture - 23
Predicate Logic: Proof Theory (Contd.)

So, you are doing predicate logic proof theory there is some small changes from last times lecture. So, I think you should just quickly go through the changes because, of certain proofs I had to make some changes.

(Refer Slide Time: 01:06)



Proof Theory: First-Order Logic

1. A first-order proof system for a mathematical theory with signature Σ consists of two parts
 - Logical Axioms and Rules** These are extensions of existing propositional proof systems to deal with quantification. However, they are still parameterised on Σ since the use of terms and substitution is involved in them.
 - Non-logical axioms** These are the axioms which define the models to which they are applicable.
2. **(First-order) Predicate Calculus:** The first-order theory with no non-logical axioms.

NPTEL

So, let us go to let us quickly go through last times lecture and then we will come to this. So, you are so as a matter of terminology so you the Proof Theory for any sigma First Order Logic essentially consists of some logical axioms and rules and, some non-logical axioms. So, of course it is possible to separate them out. So, we the first order theory with no non-logical axioms is called a predicate calculus first order predicate calculus. And, it is a good idea to look you are at properties of sort of predicate calculus before we go on to the first order any other first order theory. Because, all are the first order theories are essentially depend on the signature and the axioms through the non-logical axioms. So, for us this one just look you areas at logical validity itself for all possible kinds of different signatures. And, so we will actually look at first order predicate calculus before we go on to any first order theory.

(Refer Slide Time: 02:16)

Proof Rules: Hilbert-Style

Definition 22.1 $\mathcal{H}_1(\Sigma)$, the Hilbert-style proof system for Predicate logic consists of

- The set $\mathcal{L}_1(\Sigma)$ generated from A and $\{\neg, \rightarrow, \forall\}$
- The three logical axiom schemas **K**, **S** and **N**,
- The two axiom schemas

$\forall E$. $\frac{}{\forall x[X] \rightarrow \{t/x\}X}$, $\{t/x\}$ admissible in X

$\forall D$. $\frac{}{\forall x[X \rightarrow Y] \rightarrow (X \rightarrow \forall x[Y])}$, $x \notin FV(X)$

- The *modus ponens (MP)* rule and

$\forall I$. $\frac{\{y/x\}X}{\forall x[X]}$, $y \notin FV(X)$

NPTEL logo is visible in the bottom left corner of the slide.

And, then you are so there is a small change here this for all D there used to be quantifier for all x. So, I actually said that for all x I can distribute so at this arrow but now I am actually putting some restrictions this is. Because, of some proofs there is some problem with some proof so it had to be in this form. So, if you if X does not have small x occurring as a free variable then what it means is that rather than distribute this quantifier for all x you can push it in. So that so then this capital X becomes a quantifier free and. So, you are so it is add a certain an extra power the purpose of certain proof rules. And, it is validity is not in question because if x is anyway not a free variable of x then even if you quantify it over x it does not matter but, this form has some advantages.

The other thing is this I have also made this I think I do not know I think it was not there in this form when I spoke last time. But, this universal is introduction universal quantifier introduction or what is known as universal generalization. So, I am writing it in this form essentially what I am saying is if you ever I think I had it in this form last time also so there is no problem. So, essentially this means that if you can this Y is of completely arbitrary variable then you can quantify for x. Then, notion of arbitrary needs to be captured somehow symbolically and that is that can be a problem but, you are we went through all this is all fine you are.

(Refer Slide Time: 04:22)

The slide is titled "The Sequent Forms". It contains the following text and formulas:

The sequent forms of **K, S, N, MP** are as before. The sequent forms of the **quantification rules** are as follows:

VE.
$$\frac{}{\Gamma \vdash \forall x[X] \rightarrow \{t/x\}X}, \{t/x\} \text{ admissible in } X$$

VD.
$$\frac{}{\Gamma \vdash \forall x[X \rightarrow Y] \rightarrow (X \rightarrow \forall x[Y])}, x \notin FV(X)$$

VI.
$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \{y/x\}X}{\Gamma \vdash \forall x[X]}, y \notin FV(X) \cup FV(\Gamma)$$

Note that the variable y being quantified should not occur free in any of the assumptions Γ .

The slide also features an NPTEL logo and a navigation bar at the bottom.

Of, course we have to look you at the sequent forms of this, rules because and this, the Sequent Forms are essentially of this kind. Now, that in the sequent form what we are saying is we assume there is some set of assumptions γ for any first order theory it will be the axioms non-logical axioms might form γ . So, we have to look you are at so this γ is therefore important while we are dealing with predicate calculus it does not whether we look you are at use as the sequent form or the non sequent form. But, the moment we talk about the first order theory we are talking about a set of non logical axioms which will be there in γ . Here, again there is a small change here in the universal generalization.

So, now if you have a collection of formulae in γ and if y occurs so y obviously might occur free in this y for x of x . So, however if y occurs free in some of the formula in γ then there is no guarantee that y is an arbitrary y meaning of the word arbitrary has to be captured somehow. If, that y may not be arbitrary then you cannot necessarily generalized on it if however y occurs free only in this expression capital X with y by substituting x . And, this proof goes through then it does not depend on any particular value of y . And, therefore then it can be generalized you are so, I mean that is the intuitive reason in a formalization one has to worry about what are the free occurring names. So, if y is a name occurring in more than one of these assumptions I mean one or more of these assumptions and it also occurs free in this hypothesis. Then, it means that y is some particular kind of y I mean like Socrates for example S .

Then, it is not you cannot directly generalize then because it might because under certain interpretations. So, this may not for example then if you generalize then you may you may not preserve validity. Because, that if that y stands for only certain particular values for which this predicate is true that it does not generalize to all values. And, that is the intuitive reason why we require that this y should not be a , or should not occur free anywhere in Γ here. Any, way if y occurs bound anywhere in Γ it does not matter because that those bound y s are different from any free y . So, the notion of y being completely arbitrarily is only guaranteed if it occurs free in this formula. And, if occurs free in other formula also in Γ that means your it is like this you take the identity element for example. So, predicates dealing with the identity element cannot be universally generalized. Because, usually in any algebraic structure there will be a single identity element all other elements are not identity.

The identity might have a variable name or it might be even if it is not a constant this, the set of predicates assumptions. That you might with term free variable y might imply that y should stand only for the entity element in which case you cannot generalize arbitrary even that is the intuitive reason. Why you require that this y should not be a free variable anywhere in either in x or in any of the assumptions in Γ ? If it does occur then you are not necessarily preserving validity if you generalize on y . Whereas, it does not occur free then this y replacing small x and capital X and occurring free is essentially an arbitrary y it is not a particular y . And, hence can be generalized that is the intuitive idea why you need to be careful about the occurrences of free variables. So, in this sequent form we will actually use universal generalization in this way the.

(Refer Slide Time: 09:31)

The Case of Equality

1. In most algebraic formulations equality is a necessary binary predicate of the signature.
2. In other cases where equality may not otherwise play a prominent role, it becomes necessary because of one or more of the following reasons.
 - (a) *Syntactically distinct* terms may represent the same value in a structure either because of some axioms or because of some identifications made in a valuation i.e. it is possible that even though $s \neq t$, $\mathcal{V}_A \llbracket s \rrbracket_{v_A} = \mathcal{V}_A \llbracket t \rrbracket_{v_A}$. (see also exercise 21.1).
 - (b) Two *differently named* entities are proven to be the same entity (generally in proofs of uniqueness or in proofs by contradiction).

NPTEL

(Refer Slide Time: 09:38)

Semantics of Equality

The semantics of the binary infix atomic predicate = is defined as follows:

$$\mathcal{T}_A \llbracket s = t \rrbracket_{v_A} \stackrel{df}{=} \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \mathcal{V}_A \llbracket s \rrbracket_{v_A} = \mathcal{V}_A \llbracket t \rrbracket_{v_A} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

In the sequel we do not explicitly include equality in the signature, but assume that it is present as part of the language of **First-order Predicate Logic with Equality**.
(First-order Predicate Calculus with Equality) The first-order theory with no non-logical axioms except the axioms for equal-

NPTEL

So, then there was this Case of Equality so the case of equality of course. So the Semantics Of equality is something that we will fix because it is something that is going to be there in all algebraic structures. But, however keeping in mind the fact that, syntactically distinct terms under certain interpretations might lead to the same value in the structure. We, have to define the semantics of equality essentially as this.

So, S and T might be two distinct terms and under any interpretation A with the valuation VA this, equality is true if the value of S and the value of T are the same in the structure A and, otherwise it is false. Since, equality is sort of special we can also talk about first order predicate calculus with equality. So, which means that we have to look you are at the so I mean it is a debatable question whether the equality axioms should be considered non-logical or logical with equality lies somewhere interface between the logical and the non-logical. So, but I mean so because of this we might actually so this you have actually sort of predicate calculus with equality. Where equality is regarded as one of the logical and special binary relations binary predicates that should be available let us say.

(Refer Slide Time: 11:20)

Axioms for Equality

Equality usually is a reflexive, symmetric, transitive and substitutive relation on structures. However the following axioms are sufficient.

$$= R. \frac{}{t = t}$$

$$= S. \frac{}{(s = t) \rightarrow (\{s/x\}X \rightarrow \{t/x\}X)}, \{s/x\}, \{t/x\} \text{ admissible in } X$$

NPTEL

So, may not be true always so we let us so that is called first order predicate calculus with equality. So, let us look you are at the Axioms of Equality and I think that is so firstly of course I made a correction instead of x equals x I decided it to make it for all the terms t so, there is it reflectivity property. The second thing is that I had this notion of replacing 0 or more occurrences. Now, I have made that more uniform through this substitutivity axiom. So if S for x and t for x are both admissible in X. Then, s equals t arrow s for x of X arrow t for x of X. So, now its uniform substitution and all occurrences all free occurrences of x will be substituted this has some advantages. So, substitutivity is a, this axiom and its actually very powerful axiom.

(Refer Slide Time: 12:28)

Symmetry and Transitivity

The rule of substitutivity (=S) is sufficiently powerful to force the properties of symmetry and transitivity with the help of reflexivity and modus ponens.

$$= \text{Sym. } \frac{\Gamma \vdash s=t}{\Gamma \vdash t=s}$$

$$= \text{T. } \frac{\Gamma \vdash s=t \quad \Gamma \vdash t=u}{\Gamma \vdash s=t}$$

NPTEL

So, one thing is that normally any equality relation is also an equivalence relation. So, what you expect is that, what you expect is that the properties of symmetry and transitivity should also holds. But, this substitutivity axiom in this form is so powerful that we can actually use symmetry and transitivity as derived rules basically.

(Refer Slide Time: 13:00)

Symmetry of Equality

Proof of derived rule =Sym

Let $\Gamma = \{s = t\}$ and Let $\phi \stackrel{df}{=} x = s$. Then we have

$$\{s/x\}\phi \equiv s = s$$

$$\{t/x\}\phi \equiv t = s$$

$$\text{MP } \frac{\Gamma \vdash s = t \quad \text{=S } \frac{\Gamma \vdash s = t \rightarrow (s = s \rightarrow t = s)}{\Gamma \vdash s = s \rightarrow t = s}}{\Gamma \vdash t = s} \quad \text{=R } \frac{\Gamma \vdash s = s}{\Gamma \vdash s = s}$$

NPTEL

And, So here is a Symmetry rule and so essentially if I take s is equal to t as an assumption. And I take this formula x equals s one thing of course is that x might occur free in s for all we know is it can x occur free in s x could occur free in s. I mean there is this question of whether x is requirestly defined in which case whether you are finding in a fixed point or so on forth. But, clearly syntactically speaking there is no reason why x should not occur free in s.

Which case it can also be substituted so which means that you might actually substitute a free a term containing a free occurrence of x for occurrences of x in this predicate. And, that is not un-meaningful I mean not meaningless I mean in the sense it is still bears a syntactic meaning which is acceptable. What, I mean by that is that this kind of substitution does not get you into. So, this proof essentially shows that if I take this formula x equals s then by the symmetry rule and so on I get s equals s implies t equals s equal to s is of course is a reflexive rule. And, so and you have got an assumption s equals t so you can use modus ponens twice to get t equals s. So, can actually you can prove this symmetry so which means you can take symmetry to be derived rule rather than rather than fundamental rather than a basic rule.

(Refer Slide Time: 15:06)

Transitivity of Equality

Proof of derived rule =T
 Let $\Delta = \{s = t, t = u\}$ and $\psi \equiv s = x$. Then

$$\frac{\begin{array}{c} =S \\ \Delta \vdash t = u \rightarrow (s = t \rightarrow s = u) \quad \Delta \vdash t = u \\ \text{MP} \end{array}}{\begin{array}{c} \text{MP} \quad \Delta \vdash s = t \rightarrow s = u \quad \Delta \vdash s = t \\ \Delta \vdash s = u \end{array}}$$

NPTEL

Transitivity is also provable actually as so here again we take here we take so there we to you are a formula x equals s in the case of symmetry here we take x equals s. So, you have given assumptions s equals t and t equals u. And, you have to prove s equals u so I am going to take x

equals s as a formula. And, then it is very clear that t equals u in s equals t arrow u basically I take this formula ψ and replace t for x and u for x on this two sides. And, I have got the assumption t equals u so which means I can use modus ponens twice and finally I will get s equals u .

So, it is enough to have just these two it is enough to just have these two axioms for equality and the other two axioms can be. So, now today let us continue with predicate logic so we are going to obsess with free variables and bound variables for sometime because that is actually crucial for various things. So exactly, How can you capture the notions of arbitrariness? And, we will obsess with it also for existential quantifier later. Because, there is a question of determining whether a certain name is a constant or a variable Which should be treated like a constant and so on so forth. Whereas, lots of linguistic certainties which have to be taken care of and so we will do this.

The other thing this is that, after conversion need not be considered basic I mean some one thing you usually in all programming languages and the lambda calculus for conversion is considered an absolutely basic thing.

(Refer Slide Time: 17:17)

Alpha Conversion

Notation We use " $\phi \dashv\vdash \psi$ " as an abbreviation for the two statements " $\phi \vdash \psi$ " and " $\psi \vdash \phi$ ".

Lemma 23.1 For every formula ϕ for which $\{y/x\}$ is admissible $\forall x[\phi] \dashv\vdash \forall y[\{y/x\}\phi]$

Proof: If $\{y/x\}$ is admissible in ϕ then we may readily see that $\{x/y\}$ is also admissible in $\{y/x\}\phi$ since $x \notin FV(\{y/x\}\phi)$ and

$$\{x/y\}\{y/x\}\phi \equiv \phi$$

Further since $x \notin FV(\forall x[\phi])$ we have by axiom schema $\forall E$ $\forall x[\phi] \rightarrow \phi$ i.e.

$$\forall x[\phi] \rightarrow \{x/y\}\{y/x\}\phi$$

We then have the following **proofs**. ■

But, in a in a minimal powerful proof system Alpha Conversion can actually be proven and that is so that is the that is the first thing we will do now. However, in order to prove alpha

conversion we will actually take two formulae phi and psi. And, this is this is fairly common notation which I am introducing now for the first time. Which this essentially says that psi can be proven from phi and phi can be proven from psi. So, basically it stands for these two statements so which means that you require two proofs. So, I mean this is like this is the proof theoretic analog of if and only if you like. So, for every formula phi for which y for x is admissible for all x phi proves and can prove can be proven from for all y, y for x of phi. So, the first thing to realize is that if y for x is admissible and phi then it, means that firstly x is not a free variable of y for x of y of phi. Therefore, x for y is also admissible for y for x of y of phi. And, actually if you take x for y in y for x for phi then you get back phi it is actually a syntactic identity.

So, these this left hand side and this right hand side after substitution is a meta syntactic operation it is not a syntactic operation so meta syntactic operation expressed in this fashion. So, these two are actually are syntactically identical formulae further the x is clearly not a free variable of for all x phi. So, which means that I can apply the universal instantiation rule for all E and for all elimination to get for all x phi arrow phi where of course I am going to take this phi as basically obtained from phi by two substitutions first y for x and then x for y. So, which means that I essentially get this as a, particular case of the universal instantiation formula.

(Refer Slide Time: 20:15)

Proof trees of $\forall x[\phi] \leftrightarrow \forall y\{[y/x]\phi\}$

$$\frac{\text{R} \rightarrow \frac{\forall x[\phi] \vdash \forall x[\phi]}{\text{MP}} \quad \text{VE} \frac{\forall x[\phi] \vdash \forall x[\phi] \rightarrow [x/y][y/x]\phi}{\forall x[\phi] \vdash [x/y][y/x]\phi}}{\forall I \frac{\forall x[\phi] \vdash [x/y][y/x]\phi}{\forall x[\phi] \vdash \forall y\{[y/x]\phi\}}}$$

$$\frac{\text{R} \rightarrow \frac{\forall y\{[y/x]\phi\} \vdash \forall x\{[y/x]\phi\}}{\text{MP}} \quad \text{VE} \frac{\forall y\{[y/x]\phi\} \vdash \forall y\{[y/x]\phi\} \rightarrow [y/x]\phi}{\forall y\{[y/x]\phi\} \vdash [y/x]\phi}}{\forall I \frac{\forall y\{[y/x]\phi\} \vdash [y/x]\phi}{\forall y\{[y/x]\phi\} \vdash \forall x[\phi]}}$$

NPTEL

So, if I get this as a particular case of the universal instantiation formula then I have some trivial proofs easy proofs and have to make them small because otherwise it is because it is going beyond the screen. So, you can see that first of all for all x ϕ I can infer for all x ϕ and by quantifier elimination I actually get for all x $\phi \rightarrow x$ for ϕ y for x ϕ . And, I can use modus ponens and get x for y and y for x ϕ . And, of course x for y is admissible in this entire thing and x and y are both arbitrary essentially which means I can quantify over this. So, I can get this for all y y for x of ϕ .

Similarly I can start with for all x y for x of ϕ I get this I also get for all x y for x of $\phi \rightarrow y$ for x of ϕ . And, then by modus ponens I get y of x of ϕ and since y is arbitrary and is not does not occur free anywhere in the assumptions or here, or anywhere in the assumptions. Therefore I, can generalize on that and I get for all x ϕ . You, can some of these proofs are settle especially when you are looking at minimality you have to look at these proofs in some certain fashion.


Student: what is it for all y ?

You are you are this is that no this is that the propositional logical reflexivity this is derived by applying the deduction theorem this rule \rightarrow . So, if you want I could have called it R or the other no better I think to regard this as part of that a sweet where we said that any assumption is also provable from the assumptions. So, that is you can you can think of it that way if you like so maybe it is not you are so maybe I should not have called this \rightarrow I should have called it I mean whatever the monotonicity any assumption is also provable from this from the same assumption. It actually with that with that if you look at so I think that is the best of given that any formula ϕ belongs to the assumptions Γ . Γ proves ϕ we had that in propositional logic and we had that actually stated in a very general fashion for all theories. So, there is absolutely no reason why we cannot apply that here. So, maybe I should not so this justification is probably not $R \rightarrow$ that should have been the justification from formal theories what is, that.

We, have those things like monotonicity and so on right was it here, I thought I had it somewhere you are I have forgotten at the moment where it is and if it is not there it should be included actually but you are so this all I am saying is just writing the assumption out here. And,

that is true for here also I am writing the assumption out here. Any, proof any formal proof we had this notion of formal proof where each step of the proof is either an assumption or an axiom or obtained from some previous steps by the application of the rule of inference. So, this is the case of the step being an assumption that is all that is to do. So, this is quite justified maybe this R arrow should not have been there you are then, these two proofs go through quite easily you are. So, actually alpha conversion is something that can be proven by this.

(Refer Slide Time: 24:56)



So which brings us to the Deduction Theorem so now the deduction theorem for Predicate Calculus is a little complicated by few variables. And, precisely the notion of arbitrariness actually when is a certain name arbitrary that is the question that basically we have because if you are ever going to generalize. Then, you have to be sure that you do not generalize on some constant you would not replace the constant by a variable and put a universal generalization. You, have to generalize on some variable symbol that is somehow guaranteed to be completely arbitrary. So, we take this in analogy with what we did in preposition analogy. So, essentially I am stating this deduction theorem that was in the case of preposition logic if and only if thing with two proofs that, so I am stating this separately. So, one part is that if you do have from a set of assumptions gamma if you do have phi arrow if you can prove phi arrow psi. Then, it is perfectly safe to pull phi to the left of the turn style. So, and the proof of this is exactly as in the

case of the proposition of propositional logic. Because, of after all the proof involved just using the k axiom I think you are the using the k axiom.

(Refer Slide Time: 26:40)

(\Leftarrow). Assume $\Gamma \vdash \phi \rightarrow \psi$. Let \mathcal{T} be a formal proof tree rooted at $\phi \rightarrow \psi$ with m nodes for some $m > 0$. By monotonicity (theorem 13.1) $\Gamma, \phi \vdash \phi \rightarrow \psi$ is proven by the same tree. We may extend \mathcal{T} to the tree \mathcal{T}' by adding a new $(m + 1)$ -st leaf node ϕ and creating the $(m + 2)$ -nd root node ψ .

$$\begin{array}{c} \swarrow \mathcal{T} \searrow \\ \begin{array}{ccc} m & & m+1 \\ \phi & \rightarrow & \psi \\ \hline m+2 & & \psi \end{array} \end{array}$$

\mathcal{T}' is a proof of $\Gamma, \phi \vdash \psi$. ■



So, this is the left arrow so what we are saying is you can actually not the k axiom with you are by adding we use the monotonicity by adding an extra assumption like phi to the set of assumptions gamma you are not losing anything in the proof. So, you add that extra assumption phi and then you have phi arrow psi. So, if you have proof of phi arrow psi from gamma then you have a proof of phi arrow psi from gamma comma phi. And, of course in you also have phi and therefore you can use modus ponens and get psi. So, this is left arrow part is actually quite trivial and exactly as in the case of propositional logic it is the right arrow part. Which is slightly difficult you are the arrow part essentially says it. Supposing, I have an assumption phi that assumption phi might have some free variables no I do not know this status of those free variables they could be arbitrary some of them could actually represent some constants.

And, therefore for only certain particular valuations phi might be true. But, still if I am assuming phi and if I can prove psi then I can push phi onto the right hand side provided no free variable or phi is generalized anywhere in the proof and that is. So, if so essentially if no free variable of phi has been generalized anywhere in the proof and psi also has that free variable as if that variable free. Then, there is a good chance that free variable is not an arbitrary variable might be a

particular might be something that is true only for certain values. So, which means that it is safe to move phi to the right hand side provided again actually there is more to it no free variable or phi should also occur free in gamma. I mean any free variable that is generalized should not occur free in gamma otherwise, you cannot apply this gamma rule. And, that actually will distinguish between what is arbitrary and what is not arbitrary.

(Refer Slide Time: 29:40)

Proof of Deduction Theorem (theorem 23.2)


Proof:

- (DT⇐). The proof is identical to that of the corresponding **propositional case**.
- (DT⇒). Assume $\Gamma, \phi \vdash \psi$. Then there exists a proof tree \mathcal{T} rooted at ψ with nodes $\psi_1, \dots, \psi_m \equiv \psi$. Then the stronger claim that each step of the proof of ψ_i can be matched by a proof of $\phi \rightarrow \psi_i$ is again proven here. The proof proceeds in a manner similar to the corresponding **propositional case** for all applications of the propositional axioms and the inference rule (MP). We consider only the cases of quantification.
If ψ_j for $0 < j \leq m$ is an axiom (including an instance of $\forall E$

NPTEL

So, let us look you are at the proof of this so we are not going to go through the entire proof because of for most of the cases like the axioms. For example if, you the proof is exactly as of the propositional case so in we used for example you take so let us just worry about the quantifiers and so on. So, you take some supposing your proof actually has some m formulae m nodes it is a proof tree with m nodes the last one being the formula psi which is to be proven from the assumptions gamma and phi. Then, essentially what we did in the propositional case was that we proved that every step corresponding to the corresponding to each gamma phi proves psi i.

(Refer Slide Time: 30:31)



There, was a proof tree so essentially what we proved in the propositional case was that if I had some tree T_i in which I prove ψ_i . Then, I can construct a proof tree T_i prime rooted at this is what we did in the proposition proof.

(Refer Slide Time: 31:26)

or $\forall D$) or $\psi_j \in \Gamma$, then the proof tree \mathcal{T}'_j rooted at $\phi \rightarrow \psi_j$ is constructed from the proof tree \mathcal{T}_j rooted at ψ_j as follows.

$$\frac{j' \frac{\nwarrow \mathcal{T}_j \nearrow}{\psi_j} \quad j' + 1 \frac{}{\psi_j \rightarrow (\phi \rightarrow \psi_j)}}{j' + 2 \frac{}{\phi \rightarrow \psi_j}}$$


Suppose ψ_j was obtained by the application of the axiom schema $\forall I$ on some ψ_i such that $l(\psi_i) < l(\psi_j)$. Then $\psi_j \equiv \forall x[\psi_i]$. By the induction hypothesis there exists a proof tree \mathcal{T}'_i rooted at $\phi \rightarrow \psi_i$ and such that no free variable of ϕ has been generalized in the application. Further $x \notin FV(\phi)$. We may now extend \mathcal{T}'_i to a proof tree \mathcal{T}'_j as follows.

NPTEL

We showed that every step of this proof for every proof tree of this kind there is a proof tree of this kind. So, I will go back to the propositional proof and if you see that one of the things that

we did in the proposition case was that for so take something like any axiom for any axiom actually and in this particular case it does not matter. Because, we had those three axioms k s and n and now we have two more axioms for all E and for all D these two axioms. But, regardless of what axiom you are using you take any axiom for any step for any tree T_j rooted at sign j this you can use the k axiom to get $\psi_j \rightarrow \phi$ arrow of ψ_j . And, then you can use modus ponens to get ϕ arrow of ψ_j .

(Refer Slide Time: 32:19)



So, the fact that we added some two extra axioms does not change the proof in anyway because the proof that you can construct T_j prime given t_j given t_j is just is just an application of the k axiom and modus ponens we also had a proof from modus ponens. And, that proof is exactly as in the case of propositional logic and there is no change. The only thing therefore now to worry about is what happens for an application of the rule for all i so, if you have an application...

(Refer Slide Time: 32:55)

The Sequent Forms

The sequent forms of **K, S, N, MP** are as before. The sequent forms of the **quantification rules** are as follows:

$$\text{VE. } \frac{}{\Gamma \vdash \forall x[X \rightarrow \{t/x\}X]}, \{t/x\} \text{ admissible in } X$$

$$\text{VD. } \frac{}{\Gamma \vdash \forall x[X \rightarrow Y] \rightarrow (X \rightarrow \forall x[Y])}, x \notin FV(X)$$

$$\text{VI. } \frac{\Gamma \vdash \{y/x\}X}{\Gamma \vdash \forall x[X]}, y \notin FV(X) \cup FV(\Gamma)$$

Note that the variable y being quantified should not occur free in any of the assumptions Γ .

So, this is another rule so these two are axioms so it does not matter so, now we have to worry about this rule. So, if you do have this rule then we look you are at this way. So, if you have that means you up you inferred ψ_j by an application of for all i on some ψ_i . And, this proof is by induction on the depth of the proof tree essentially on the levels of the proof tree.

(Refer Slide Time: 33:41)

$\begin{array}{ccc} & G_i & \\ & \swarrow \quad \searrow & \\ \Gamma, \varphi \vdash \psi_i & & \end{array}$


$\begin{array}{ccc} & G'_i & \\ & \swarrow \quad \searrow & \\ \Gamma, \varphi \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi_i & & \end{array}$

$\psi_j \equiv \forall x[\psi_i] \quad x \in FV(\psi_i)$

So, which means that by the induction hypothesis i can actually assume that there is a proof tree T_i rooted at γ, ϕ, ψ_i . And, correspondingly by induction hypothesis i can assume that i have already constructed the proof tree T_i' . And, which has $\phi \rightarrow \psi_i$ given that ψ_j would therefore if ψ_j was obtained from ψ_i by an application for all i . Then, essentially what I have is there is some variable x . Such that well ψ_i is here, let us say is that fine and x may have occurred free in ψ_i . So, x maybe free in ψ_i you are and basically now what we have to show is that we can construct this proof tree T_j' provided all these conditions are satisfied and what are these conditions.

This conditions are just this so one thing is if you prove this so one thing that your assumption tells you is that no variable in ϕ has been generalized. So, if you generalized on this x the x is not a free variable of ϕ first thing. And, further if you actually apply this generalization x is also not a free variable of γ anywhere.

(Refer Slide Time: 36:02)



So, then what you have is I start with this T_i' which proves $\phi \rightarrow \psi_i$. And, I generalize it to get for all x $\phi \rightarrow \psi_i$. And, I can apply universal generalization here because x is not a free variable of ϕ and it is not of a free variable of γ . And, so I can do this generalization I have from my new axiom I add a new axiom which says for all x $\phi \rightarrow \psi_i$. So, this axiom so this is why I had to change that

axiom for all D . So, this is an application for all D since x is not a free variable of ϕ is because x is not a free variable of ϕ that you could do this generalization. But, given that x is not a free variable of ϕ therefore you can push this for all x inside and you can get this.

And, when you get this therefore this then I can apply modus ponens. And, I get for all x ψ if I get ϕ arrow for all x ψ and this is just ϕ arrow of ψ . So, if x had been a free variable of ϕ then all this things could not have been done so this deduction theorem actually is slightly settled. So, this deduction theorem in this fashion so actually be able to apply this deduction theorem most of time you would not be able to looking at it in all it is certainties. I mean there are there is one thing is clear the deduction theorem holds for propositions.

So, one thing is clear that if you are you take any general theory all you send all your formulae are likely to be closed formulae because, you are trying to prove general theorems. So, when you prove general theorems there are no free variables. So, the deduction theorem in its propositional formed becomes directly available.

(Refer Slide Time: 38:22)

Useful Corollaries

Corollary 23.3 If the proof of $\Gamma, \phi \vdash \psi$ involves no generalization of any free variable of ϕ then $\Gamma \vdash \phi \rightarrow \psi$.

Corollary 23.4 If ϕ is a closed formula and $\Gamma, \phi \vdash \psi$ then $\Gamma \vdash \phi \rightarrow \psi$.

Corollary 23.5 If no free variable of $\Gamma = \{\phi_1, \dots, \phi_m\}$ is generalized in a proof of $\Gamma \vdash \psi$, then $\vdash \phi_1 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow \phi_m \rightarrow \psi$.

NPTEL

So, actually so Corollary of this is the following if ϕ is a closed formula and from Γ, ϕ you can prove ψ then, you can assume that you can prove from Γ, ϕ arrow ψ . So, even if ψ is not a closed formula it does matter it does not matter. But, most importantly if you are proving very general theorems if all the formulae that you are taking as assumptions are closed

formulae like the group theoretical axioms and trying to prove general properties of groups. If, all of them are closed formulae then your deduction theorem is anyway applicable without any problem. It, is only when your formulae actually use some free variables that you have to be careful about whether you are following in the conditions of the deduction theorem before you use it. So, essentially in order to prove if ϕ_1 to ϕ_n are all closed formulae then I can either decide to prove this or I can decide to prove take all of them as assumptions. And, prove ψ from these assumptions and both of them are equivalent.


And, so the other thing is supposing your proof actually is a proof of some very specific object which is being which is called x let us say. And, your proof is all about that then anyway you would not generalize on it. So, you take any proof which does not have a, involve any generalization there again the deduction theorem is applicable so that is the first corollary. So, if the proof of ψ from Γ, ϕ involves no generalization of any free variable then from Γ you can claim that $\phi \rightarrow \psi$ is true if ϕ is a closed formula. Then, you can claim that from Γ and ϕ if you proved ψ and prove that Γ proves $\phi \rightarrow \psi$. And, if all your there are no free variables anywhere then you can apply this deduction theorem. The only case where you have to worry about, whether the deduction theorem is at all applicable is a case when a generalization has taken place in the proof.

So, it requires going through the proof tree to find out whether there is any occurrence of universal generalization. And, if you are doing an occurrence of universal generalization you have to check basically whether the free variables in this assumption ϕ have been generalized or not. If, none of the free variables ϕ has been generalized then again you are safe you can just apply the deduction theorem. If, a free variable of ϕ has been generalized sort of or you are using some if a free variable of ϕ has been generalized in you cannot push it. But, remember that normally what you want to do is you want to factor everything which appears on the left side of arrows as an assumption.

So, which means you are looking at all free variables of ϕ_1 to ϕ_n in order to have these two equivalents it requires that, any proof which involves proving ψ from Γ does not generalize any of the free variables in ϕ_1 to ϕ_n if it does not in. But, if it generalize something else may be generalizes a free variable in ψ which is not present in ϕ_1 to ϕ_n then you are still safe. So, there are various conditions it becomes very settle at this point you

know. So, under what conditions you can actually check whether the deduction theorem is applicable. Now, actually it is now the question is whether I should go into soundness or postpone that. So, there is of course a question of existential quantification also so which but that may be let us do this soundness. So, you are first proposition you are I have not actually I have not spoken about, existential quantifier. But, the point is that you are existential quantifier is going to be defined by the Demorgan rule.

(Refer Slide Time: 43:24)


$$\exists x[\varphi] \triangleq \neg \forall x[\neg \varphi]$$

You are essentially called in a Hilbert style proof system your essential stating that this formula is being is going to be defined as naught of for all x naught phi. So, you are going to use this definition. So, the notion of arbitrary in particular then take a certain meaning here usually with the existential quantifiers. And, we have to be able to justify some of the proof methods that we use for existential quantifiers from the Hilbert style system itself. But that is a, little complicated so I will postpone that in the mean time just let us look at this it is soundness. Firstly of course that you take anywhere well formed formula which is an instance of a propositional tautology no valuation can change it no model can change it is always going to be true. So, tautologess of this is preserved by the by that propositional tautologess of this form. So, you can essentially take so this proposition I am not even going to prove.

(Refer Slide Time: 44:43)

Soundness of Predicate Calculus

Proposition 23.6 Every wff of \mathcal{L}_1 which is an instance of a tautology of Propositional logic is a theorem of PC and may be obtained using only the axiom schemas K, S, N and the rule MP.

■

Theorem 23.7 Consistency of Th(PC). The theory PC is consistent i.e. the set Th(PC) of theorems of PC form a consistent set.

□

NPTEL

Essentially what, we are saying is so that is equivalent to saying that you take any predicate formula which can be derived by just using K, S, N and MP it is always going to be valid. So, all propositional of this forms with corresponding propositions replace the predicates do not change the truth value ever and their validity can be proved. So, in that sense K, S, N and MP are sound rules for predicate logic. So, the other interesting thing is that you take so, I am going to use Th of so I am looking at predicate calculus itself as a theory. You, know with theses axioms K, S, N and MP for all i for all e for all D. And, the PC stands for all the theorems of this theory.

So a formal theory take a set of all theorem of this theory so whatever is provable by the Hilbert in predicate calculus by the Hilbert style proof system. So, this theory is first of all is consistent that means all the theorems that you prove have truth values. They have models and valuations have interpretations in which they can be made true it is important. Because, the consistency of this set of formulae is required to show that your proof system is itself is sound.

(Refer Slide Time: 46:26)

Proof of theorem 23.7

Proof: Define the *erasure* of a formula $e(\phi)$ as the propositional formula obtained by deleting all terms and all quantifiers and retaining only the atomic predicate symbols and propositional connectives. The function e may be defined by induction on the structure of the formula ϕ .

- *Claim 0.* For each instance of the axioms of \mathcal{H}_1 , the erasure of the formulae yields tautologies (of propositional logic)
- *Claim 1.* The erasure of each application of the rules of \mathcal{H}_1 , preserves tautologous-ness, i.e. if the erasure of the premises of a rule are all propositional tautologies then so is the erasure of the conclusion.
- *Claim 2.* The erasure of every formula in $\text{Th}(\text{PC})$ is a tautology.

If $\text{Th}(\text{PC})$ were inconsistent then $\text{Th}(\text{PC}) = \mathcal{L}_1$. In particular, there exist formulae $\phi, \neg\phi \in \text{Th}(\text{PC})$. But then by the definition of erasure we have $e(\neg\phi) \equiv \neg e(\phi)$ which contradicts *Claim 2*. ■

NPTEL

So this, the consistency of this is just depends upon these claims so I take any of the any of the theorems any of the formulae in the theory of predicate calculus some formula ϕ . And, I define what is known as its erasure you are the erasure of the formula is just that I remove everything that is violet in color from it I remove all the terms I retain only the atomic predicate symbols. And, I remove all the quantifiers if I remove all the quantifiers I also removed all the variables if I removed all the terms i have removed all the variables.

So, the quantifiers are anyway of no use I removed all the quantifiers. When, I remove all the terms and all the quantifiers whatever, I left with I am left with something that looks purely propositional. It just looks like a, proposition with propositional atoms and propositional connectors is like naught and arrow and so and so that is all so it looks like a purely propositional formula. So, the erasure of a formula $e \phi$ is just a purely propositional form with propositional connectors no quantifiers no terms nothing. Now, you take any of the theorems of first order logic so you take anything that is provable in the Hilbert style system H1.

(Refer Slide Time: 48:05)

Proof Rules: Hilbert-Style

Definition 22.1 $\mathcal{H}_1(\Sigma)$, the Hilbert-style proof system for Predicate logic consists of

- The set $\mathcal{L}_1(\Sigma)$ generated from A and $\{\neg, \rightarrow, \forall\}$
- The three logical axiom schemas **K**, **S** and **N**,
- The two axiom schemas

$$\forall E. \frac{}{\forall x[X] \rightarrow \{t/x\}X}, \{t/x\} \text{ admissible in } X$$

$$\forall D. \frac{}{\forall x[X \rightarrow Y] \rightarrow (X \rightarrow \forall x[Y])}, x \notin FV(X)$$

- The *modus ponens (MP)* rule and

$$\forall I. \frac{\{y/x\}X}{\forall x[X]}, y \notin FV(X)$$



The erasure and take the erasure of any of the formulae that you get as theorems the erasure is always a tautological form for all the axioms. So, for K, S and N it is easy to show that they are just tautological forms the only thing therefore is to show for these two. But, for these two you can see I mean if I erase if x is a purely propositional atom. And, I am going to erase this for all x and I want to erase all this p for x because I am erasing all the terms there all the violet terms. So, then what am I left with I am just left with $x \rightarrow x$ which is total of this form similarly in the case of all D when I do the erasure I am just left with $x \rightarrow y \rightarrow x \rightarrow y$. Which, is also a tautologous form.

So, the erasure ensures that you will have only totals of this forms and in fact. So, the modus ponens rule of course preserves total of this form that is not the problem the problem is with universal generalization. Here, again when I do the erasure, What do I get from x ? I get x which preserves tau tautologies if x is a tau tautology then x would also be a tautology. So, all so the erasure is such that all the axioms and the inference rules of H_1 of this system H_1 the axioms only create total of this forms the rule of inference preserve total of this forms. So, if they had a hypothesis which a tautologous then the rules would ensure that the conclusions are also tautologous the erasure is of the conclusion is also tautologous.

So, claim 0 essentially says that the erasure of all the axioms gives you tautologous forms claim 1 says that the erasure in every rule preserves total of this form. So, if the hypothesis was a tautologous form then the conclusion would be also the tautologous form. And, then claim 2 says that the erasure of every formula and PC is the tautology because every proof just preserves total of this forms. So, now you take the erasure of the theorems of PC you will get only tautologies. So, all the sentences in theory of PC you apply erasure on all of them you will get only tautologies. Now, we know that that has to be consistent. But, now but that does not mean that theory of PC itself will be consistent it is only the erasure.

Since, it produces only tautologous forms it will be consistent. So, now we argue why contradiction suppose theory of PC contains supposing it were inconsistent then firstly the theory of PC would be the whole language L_1 . And, in particular there will exist two formulas ϕ and $\neg\phi$ belonging to the theory of PC. But, if ϕ and $\neg\phi$ both long to the theory of PC then there erasure should both be tautologies. But, $\neg\phi$ does not get erased. So, you will get the erasure of $\neg\phi$ is just \neg of the erasure of ϕ you are so you will get a contradiction in propositional logic. Which, is not possible and therefore we know that propositional logic is sound and creates only tautologies. So, therefore the theories of PC is consistent.